Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution
A comparative study of member states and accession countries

Edited by Thomas König and Simon Hug
This new book presents a wealth of new data documenting and analyzing the different positions taken by European governments in the development of the European constitution.

Understanding how constitutional decisions are taken in the EU is of great societal and scientific relevance. This volume examines how these decisions have substantial effects on the sovereignty of nation states and on the lives of citizens, independent of the ratification of a constitution.

Few efforts have been made to document constitution building in a systematic and comparative manner, including the different steps and stages of the process. This book examines European constitution building by tracing the two-level policy formation process from the draft proposal of the European Convention until the Intergovernmental Conference, which finally adopted the document on the constitution in June 2004. Following a tight comparative framework, it sheds light on reactions to the proposed constitution in the domestic arena of all the actors involved. The volume includes a chapter on each of the original 15 member states and the ten accession states, plus chapters on the European Commission and European Parliament.

Building a clear understanding of the affects of constitutional decisions, the book will be of strong interest to scholars and researchers of European Union politics, comparative politics and policy making.

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Introduction

Thomas König and Simon Hug

This book is about one of the most important real scale policy-making processes of our time: the formation of positions on the constitution of the second biggest economic power. In scope and significance there is perhaps only one parallel in history to the policy-making process for the "Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe," namely the creation of the American constitution in 1776. This process has been characterized by a number of critical events, the most recent being the negative referendum outcome in France and the Netherlands. Independent of the outcome - whether the constitution will be ratified or not - understanding how this treaty emerged and how this policy-making process has been carried out is of great societal and scientific relevance. The decision on the constitution affects a growing number of countries and the lives of their citizens. In case of ratification, Europe will have a constitution which defines the "rules of the game" for at least 25 member states. However, if ratification should fail, the Treaty of Nice (2003) will remain in force, leading, according to some authors, to a high risk of gridlock. Exploring and explaining the process having led to the elaboration and decision on the "Constitution for Europe" is thus an important task of political scientists in our days. The current political science literature on the EU - whether the intergovernmentalist, the two-level game, the constructivist or the (multilevel) governance school of thought - makes claims about the nature of this process, but few efforts have yet been made to document this process in a systematic and comparative manner, covering the different steps and stages.

The most cited intergovernmentalist work suggests a one-shot process, in which the three largest member states dominate inter-state bargaining at Intergovernmental Conferences, which transform their political-economic interests into the most efficient institutional structure (Moravcsik 1998). It is our contention that understanding EU constitutional policy making can be improved only by taking into account all the relevant actors involved and by considering the particular nature of this process, which combines the domestic and European level across multiple stages. This book is the first attempt to trace the two-level policy formation process from the draft
proposal of the European Convention until the Intergovernmental Conference, which finally adopted the document on the constitution in October 2004. The authors of this book try to make a substantial contribution to this process by shedding light on reactions on the proposed draft text in the domestic arena of all the actors involved, namely the 15 member states and former ten accession countries plus the Commission and the European Parliament. At the time of writing (August 2005) more than half of the member states have already ratified the constitutional text, and each chapter describes how the respective governments formed their positions, which domestic actors were involved in this preference formation process, and whether they were able to develop coherent positions on the European constitution. Although this book does not examine the ongoing ratification stage, the insight into the policy formation and coordination stage might already improve our understanding of the outcome of the final stage.

After the revisions of the treaties at the Intergovernmental Conferences in Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) and the accession of ten countries from eastern and southern Europe in May 2004, this process of constitutional building has already achieved important goals. Under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the European Convention drafted a proposal for constitutional reform that contained the key reform issues for a constitutional treaty including the basic principles of the EU, the regulation of material policy competencies and a reform of the institutional framework. This draft was sent to the 25 member and accession states, the Commission and the European Parliament, which coordinated their positions on the constitutional text in preparation for the summit negotiations of the Intergovernmental Conference in December 2003. They circulated the draft text among core (domestic) actors, held hearings and discussions on particular topics, and evaluated strategies for the upcoming summit. But how did the countries carry out their preferences on the constitutional text? How did they organize this preparatory process, and which domestic actors were involved? How contested were the specific issues among these actors, and did they make claims for vital issues, which would signal a threat against member state sovereignty? This book explains how these issues came on the domestic agenda, how the 27 institutional actors coordinated their positions in reaction to the Convention proposal, how cohesive the preferences were in the domestic arena, and which of the issues were particularly contested.

**Outline of the book**

This book provides detailed comparative insights into these coordination processes in the 25 member states (from which ten were still accession countries during the period under study), the Commission and the European Parliament. After introducing the theoretical framework of veto players, which explains why a constitutional reform of the institutional rules was necessary and which dangers will exist in case of ratification failure, and after providing empirical evidence that these reform issues were the most contested ones at the European Convention, each of the remaining country chapters introduces the formal coordination procedure, outlines the most contested issues in the domestic arena and studies the coherence of the national positions depending from the positions of the domestic actors involved. From a comparative perspective, the book considers not only the 27 institutional actors (25 countries plus Commission and European Parliament) involved at the European level, but it also relaxes the assumption that these actors are unitary in nature. In almost every case, we find multiple relevant domestic actors with divergent positions from the official (national) position. Their divergence indicates how contested the draft and specific issues are in the preparatory stage of the summit. Can we ignore these diverging positions, or should one even disregard countries which make claims for vital issues?

We believe that the inclusion of all relevant actors and issues is an important step forward in political analysis in general, and in the analysis of the policy-making process on the European constitution in particular. In our view, the exclusion of (signatory) actors risks bias in the findings, because smaller countries might have a decisive say in the constitutional negotiation and ratification processes. In addition to the unitary actor assumption of earlier studies on member state treaty formation, the absence of coherence of domestic actors might also explain why some member states changed their views during this process, and why some actors were more successful in determining the outcome, the constitutional draft text. The most prominent example during the constitution-building process is certainly the shift in the Spanish position due to the conservative government's electoral defeat. Similar events can be found in Poland where the unpopular Miller government blocked an agreement in December 2003. Without these governmental changes, we could hardly explain the compromise found in the June 2004 declaration of the Irish presidency on the constitutional agreement among the current 25 member states.

Comparing these characteristics requires a systematic collection of detailed information on preference formation. The combination of systematic and empirical rigour means that the present study should be of interest to both theorists and more empirically oriented social scientists. The empirical focus of this study consists of the stage of policy making after the presentation of the draft proposals by the European Convention. Most chapters examine the policy debates that took place on a large range of issues, both within the member states and accession countries and within the two main institutional actors: the Commission and the European Parliament. The authors of this book avoid the temptation of exploring these processes only on the basis of anecdotal evidence, practitioners'
reports of the extent to which actual processes correspond with those postulated in theories, or easily quantifiable aspects, such as percentages of accepted or rejected convention amendments. Instead, with the help of key informants who were involved in the policy-making process, each chapter painstakingly reconstructs what were the main elements: the constitutional issues at stake and the positions of the relevant political actors involved.

Today we know that some actors - such as the Spanish and Polish governments - have changed part of their positions over time, others revealed different positions at the domestic and the European level (König 2005). This points to the collective and strategic nature of policy making of actors having participated in the following summit negotiations. Instead of stimulating a constitutional debate in their domestic arena, they focused on preparation for the summit. They coordinated their national positions and were able to find agreement on the constitutional text in June 2004. The Commission and the European Parliament played a significant role in the process of constitution building by providing information and preparing the agenda. Since the entry into force depends on ratifying opposing interests, the risked excluding major societal interests. The Freerich and the According to their findings, into force depends on ratifying were.

This configuration of diverging and governing actors having participated in the following summit negotiations. Instead of accepting or rejecting convention amendments. Instead, with the help of T. König and arrived at a political compromise in November 2003. The constitutional reform which gave most of the decision-making authority to the Council - had made decision making very difficult. In addition, the Nice arrangements - which gave most of the decision-making authority to the Council - had increased the powers of the judiciary and the bureaucracies. The European Convention under the presidency of Valérie Giscard d'Estaing was able to reverse all these elements, but (smaller) member states had different interests in constitutional reform. This configuration of diverging and sometimes opposing interests is outlined in the following chapter on the European Convention by König et al. These authors analyze the collective nature of these actors - which gave most of the decision-making authority to the Council - had increased the powers of the judiciary and the bureaucracies. The European Convention under the presidency of Valérie Giscard d'Estaing was able to reverse all these elements, but (smaller) member states had different interests in constitutional reform. This configuration of diverging and sometimes opposing interests is outlined in the following chapter on the European Convention by König et al. These authors analyze the collective nature of the Laeken reform issues and ask whether the traditional cleavages in European integration - based on population size (smaller versus large countries), institutional affiliation (governmental versus parliamentary origin) and membership status (members versus accession countries) - also appeared in the Convention's debates among the 102 delegates from the 15 member states, 13 accession states plus Commission and European Parliament. Their empirical analysis of the delegations' reform positions provides strong evidence for Tsebelis's argument that the institutional issues were decisive for constitutional reform. According to their findings, the traditional cleavages existed on these reform issues and the conflicting groups had opposite interests in their solution.

The following chapters introduce the coordination processes of the 27 actors, namely the 25 member states plus the Commission and the European Parliament. Each chapter briefly describes the situation in these countries, respectively supranational actors, before outlining the organizational structure of the coordination procedure. These procedures are important to understanding the access of specific actors. In most countries we find that the foreign office was in charge of the coordination, while the prime minister's office took the lead in countries with strong presidential features. In most countries governmental actors dominated the internal coordination process but there exist differences with regard to the structure of the process, the number of actors involved and their institutional
affiliation. Note that parliamentary actors rarely participated in these coordination processes, and mostly only in the Nordic countries was parliament formally included in the preference formation process.

A major innovation of this book is using the preferences of the actors involved to describe the policy-formation process in the community. The data gathering was prepared in several steps. First, we had to define the boundaries of the constitutional space and decide to consider every issue which was contested between at least two actors during the Convention deliberations. For their identification, we studied the Convention documents, and in particular the amendments were used to extract the set of contested issues and their alternatives. We applied three criteria to determine the final set of issues for our questionnaire:

1. thematic classification (synthesis);
2. number of amendments proposed (prominence);
3. number of alternatives proposed (thematic variety).

This procedure produced a set of 65 issues which contain general issues (charter of fundamental rights, subsidiary, etc.), issues on institutions and procedures (presidency of the Council, etc.), on legal instruments (right of initiative, etc.) and on various policy fields. A broader classification lists 25 issues as substantial and 40 issues as institutional topics. The ordinal scales of their alternatives range from two to five possible alternatives. Finally, the construct validity of the questionnaire listing these issues and alternatives was examined in a pre-test done with the German scientific adviser of a German Convention member, Professor Dr. Oppermann. The questionnaire listed the issues and alternatives, and we ordered the alternatives according to their integrationist degree, understood as a transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level. Interviewees were also asked to mention those issues which were vital for an actor. Vital issues are defined as decisive issues for which the outcome is crucial for an actor to sign the treaty. It turned out that about half of the 65 issues (33) were vital for at least one of the actors.

To identify the domestic actors and the positions of the national position, of the leading ministry and of the relevant domestic actors, we carefully selected a number of experts in each country. Each DOSEI team used its own contacts with experts in the member and former accession states. Furthermore, we were able to operate in almost any EU-speaking language, which helped us to contact the experts and to conduct the interviews in the 25 countries. The DOSEI interviewers were also trained in a workshop before the fieldwork was conducted. To increase reliability we agreed to interview more than one expert per country, and at least one of the experts interviewed should be from inside the government. Moreover, we tried to collect this information before the end of the summit.

For gathering data on the policy-making process of the 27 actors (25 member states, European Parliament, Commission), we interviewed 82 experts, of whom 47 (57 percent) were from inside government. The majority of these interviews was finished before Christmas 2003 (85 percent). The remaining interviews were completed until February 2004 with the notable exception of the three additional interviews conducted with experts of the new Spanish government in May 2004.

An additional indication for the validity is certainly the high response rate by the experts. We interviewed 3.05 experts on average, and the adjusted cross-validity of the experts was about 85 percent in the entire data set, ranging from 66.8 percent for each of the actors in the Commission to 95.1 percent in the case of the Irish national position. The experts were instructed to describe the national positions, the positions of the leading ministry and other relevant actors when they diverged from the national positions. The experts mentioned a total of 110 relevant domestic actors, 75 (67 percent) thereof are governmental actors, the remaining actors come from parliamentary committees and interest groups. Only 3.3 percent of the cells in the remaining actors-times-issue matrix remained empty. Due to our research design, we could reduce the number of missing positions to about 1.2 percent, which can still be imputed by different methods (König et al. 2005).

Some experts, however, differed in their evaluation of a given actor's position. In order to determine the position of an actor having been evaluated differently by several experts, the interviewers ranked the experts according to the view of the experts' competence. This allowed us to select between the different indications with regard to the most competent expertise. In case of any missing value, the indication of the second most competent expert has been used, etc. Since we asked only for relevant domestic actors deviating from the national position, we could replace the non-indication of an actor with the respective national position. This procedure reduced the percentage of lacking information from about 3.3 percent to 1.4 percent. Finally, we completed the data set by adding information on the alternative proposed by the draft constitution, the location of the status quo according to the Nice Treaty and – at a later stage – the outcome of the summit agreed in June 2004.

These data are used in each chapter which offers an empirical evaluation of the coherence of actors' positions and points to the vital issues mentioned by the actors involved. In addition to finding reliable estimators for the national positions of the 27 actors, the literature on two-level games reminds us of the importance of including the views of the domestic actors, in particular if those actors must ratify the final agreement. This is also essential in the study of the bargaining outcome and negotiation success. Because ratification often faces higher institutional hurdles than those for government formation and delegation, actors can make credible claims for receiving concessions with respect to their ratification problems at home (König and Hug 2000, Hug and König 2002,
The European Convention and the Rome and Brussels IGCs
A veto players analysis
George Tsebelis

The European Union (EU) is in the process of adopting a constitution. A European Convention under the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing elaborated the document, which was presented at the Intergovernmental Conference of Rome at the end of 2003 and was rejected. The rejection led to a new text adopted at the Brussels IGC which from the point of view of this analysis is close to a 50-50 split between the Nice and the Convention texts.

This is not a new situation for the EU. After a period of constitutional and policy inertia, the EU adopted new constitutional arrangements in 1987, 1991, 1997, and 2001, all before the Convention. This means that each EU constitution has lasted for three to four years on average. Debate over the functioning of political institutions has preceded each new constitutional arrangement. In effect, the EU has been in a process of continuous constitutional design (and redesign) for about 15 years.

What was the response of the institutional literature to all these changes? For a long period of time, these changes were ignored because the literature (an offshoot of the International Relations literature) was embroiled in a paradigmatic war that left the study of political institutions ignored: intergovernmentalists neglected the study of institutions because of major developments at intergovernmental conferences, and neofunctionalists ignored institutions altogether in favor of spillover processes (for a discussion see Garrett and Tsebelis 1996 and Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). The institutional descriptions of the EU were based on neologisms like: It is “neither a state nor an international organization” (Sbragia 1992: 257); “less than a Federation, more than a Regime” (Wallace 1983: 403); “stuck between sovereignty and integration” (Wallace 1982: 67), “institutionalized Intergovernmentalism in a supranational organization” (Cameron 1992: 69); the “middle ground between the cooperation of existing nations and the breaking of a new one” (Schurp 1988: 242). Some scholars even took advantage of the lack of theoretical grounding: Sbragia (1992: 258) approvingly quotes Krislov, Ehlermann, and Weiler claiming: “The absence of a clear model, for one thing, makes ad hoc analogies more appropriate and justifiable. If one may not specify what are clear analogies, less clear ones may be appropriate.”
opinion in government in the various countries. The comparative examination showed three distinct patterns of countries, two of them raising concerns of the success of the constitution-building process. Interestingly enough the degree of cohesion in opinions was unrelated to any economic and institutional differences we studied in this chapter. We found, however, that a public opinion clearly supporting the EU integration process depresses considerably the amount of divergent opinion.

We were also able to show that the divergences in opinion among the governmental actors did not have detrimental effects on the various national positions. Clearly, there were differences that did not matter, for instance the divergent view points in the Belgian government, whose actors all clearly favored the EU constitution. On the other hand, in some other countries like Denmark, the divergent views may have been more significant. In countries like this, we find that some domestic actors seem to have preferred the current set of treaties to the draft proposal. In these countries it will be interesting to assess whether the ratification process will show similar divisions or not. This analysis showed that the concern for some vital issues led to divisions in the governmental preference formation process rather late in the day, most likely also linked to the announcement of the ten referendums on the EU constitution. Whether the constitution will survive, whether the remaining countries will continue to ratify the treaty, and how France and the Netherlands will react on this process remains an open question. However, our analyses surprisingly indicate that a constitutional solution would be possible, as long as the actors consider the Nice Treaty as the reference for the status quo.

Acknowledgments

We gratefully appreciate the research assistance by Stephanie Daimer and Annika Raudonat, as well as the financial support by the European Commission, the Swiss Bundesamt für Bildung und Wissenschaft (grant No. BBW 02.0815) and the Grundlagenforschungsfonds of the University of St Gallen (grant No. G12161105).

Notes

1 Given the focus on national domestic institutions in what follows, we will refrain from discussing the European Parliament and Commission in the sections that follow.
2 Hug and Schulz (2005) discuss the approach chosen here in more detail.
3 Martin and Quinn (2004) provide an implementation in R.
4 Jackman (2004) argues that the mean of the posterior distribution can be interpreted as the maximum-likelihood estimate under the assumption of uninformative priors.

Appendix 1

Questions employed and results of factor analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>( \lambda_1 ) (s.e.)</th>
<th>( \lambda_2 ) (s.e.)</th>
<th>( \lambda_3 ) (s.e.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 Charter of Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>1.644 (-0.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.085 (-0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 Subsidiarity</td>
<td>1.794 (0.316)</td>
<td>0.145 (0.394)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 Religious reference</td>
<td>0.240 (-0.054)</td>
<td>0.129 (0.456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 Right to withdraw from the Union</td>
<td>0.503 (0.303)</td>
<td>-0.125 (0.325)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5a Market economy</td>
<td>2.278 (0.480)</td>
<td>-0.203 (0.499)</td>
<td>-0.035 (0.509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5b Employment</td>
<td>1.658 (0.465)</td>
<td>-0.066 (0.485)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5c Competitiveness</td>
<td>1.969 (0.347)</td>
<td>-0.403 (1.015)</td>
<td>-0.126 (0.955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6 Presidency of the European Council</td>
<td>0.800 (0.144)</td>
<td>-0.142 (0.548)</td>
<td>0.172 (0.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7 Election of the Council president</td>
<td>-0.756 (0.151)</td>
<td>0.208 (0.629)</td>
<td>0.148 (0.584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8 QMV</td>
<td>0.788 (0.148)</td>
<td>-0.185 (0.469)</td>
<td>0.146 (0.581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9 Number of commissioners</td>
<td>-0.167 (0.163)</td>
<td>-0.378 (0.866)</td>
<td>-0.079 (0.847)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10 Appointment of Commission president</td>
<td>-0.887 (0.138)</td>
<td>0.040 (0.301)</td>
<td>0.098 (0.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11 Appointment of commissioners</td>
<td>0.113 (0.160)</td>
<td>-0.346 (0.751)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.885)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12 External representation</td>
<td>2.211 (0.284)</td>
<td>-0.095 (0.251)</td>
<td>0.064 (0.306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13a Appointment of Foreign Minister</td>
<td>1.488 (0.185)</td>
<td>-0.084 (0.533)</td>
<td>0.117 (0.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13b Additional approval by the EP</td>
<td>-0.525 (0.143)</td>
<td>0.241 (0.553)</td>
<td>0.032 (0.551)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>$\lambda_1$ (s.e.)</th>
<th>$\lambda_3$ (s.e.)</th>
<th>$\lambda_5$ (s.e.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q14 ECJ jurisdiction</td>
<td>1.0490 (0.1520)</td>
<td>0.0850 (0.5070)</td>
<td>0.1820 (0.4150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15.2 European Parliament</td>
<td>-1.7000 (0.2710)</td>
<td>0.3690 (1.0910)</td>
<td>0.2570 (0.9220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15.3 Council</td>
<td>-1.2480 (0.1520)</td>
<td>0.0690 (0.2600)</td>
<td>-0.0600 (0.2940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15.4 National parliaments</td>
<td>-2.9500 (0.4150)</td>
<td>0.1550 (0.5610)</td>
<td>-0.0210 (0.5920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15.5 Citizens</td>
<td>-0.3740 (0.1980)</td>
<td>-0.1280 (0.3160)</td>
<td>-0.0010 (0.9310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q16 Enhanced cooperations</td>
<td>3.7020 (0.5160)</td>
<td>-0.8520 (1.7900)</td>
<td>0.0820 (2.0100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.1 Agriculture</td>
<td>1.2480 (0.1460)</td>
<td>-0.0110 (0.2920)</td>
<td>0.0890 (0.2935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.2 Structural and cohesion policies</td>
<td>1.8880 (0.2100)</td>
<td>0.0020 (0.2610)</td>
<td>0.0920 (0.2420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.3 Area of freedom, security and justice</td>
<td>2.2950 (0.2860)</td>
<td>-0.2980 (0.6670)</td>
<td>0.0580 (0.7600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.4 Foreign policy</td>
<td>0.8570 (0.1650)</td>
<td>-0.9480 (0.7450)</td>
<td>0.0960 (0.8730)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.5 Economic policy</td>
<td>2.7100 (0.3790)</td>
<td>-0.1490 (0.6320)</td>
<td>0.2650 (0.7220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.6 Tax harmonization</td>
<td>2.7820 (0.3780)</td>
<td>-0.1590 (0.7100)</td>
<td>0.2980 (0.7970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.7 Employment policy</td>
<td>2.8420 (0.4060)</td>
<td>0.0470 (0.5590)</td>
<td>0.2540 (0.5780)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.8 Social policy</td>
<td>2.2080 (0.2830)</td>
<td>-0.1870 (0.6690)</td>
<td>0.0560 (0.7970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.9 Health</td>
<td>2.5610 (0.3630)</td>
<td>-0.2340 (0.6120)</td>
<td>0.0810 (0.6110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.10 Environment</td>
<td>-0.6380 (0.1850)</td>
<td>0.0580 (0.6200)</td>
<td>0.2470 (0.5360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.11 Education</td>
<td>2.2550 (0.3760)</td>
<td>0.2610 (0.4060)</td>
<td>0.1670 (0.3850)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17.12 Research, technological development and space</td>
<td>0.2920 (0.1444)</td>
<td>-0.2730 (0.5820)</td>
<td>0.0640 (0.6770)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.2 Structural and cohesion policies</td>
<td>1.5370 (0.1680)</td>
<td>0.1290 (0.3480)</td>
<td>0.0050 (0.3680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.3 Area of freedom, security and justice</td>
<td>0.5000 (0.1360)</td>
<td>-0.2130 (0.4860)</td>
<td>0.0390 (0.5450)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.4 Internal market</td>
<td>2.3190 (0.3680)</td>
<td>-0.1570 (0.6670)</td>
<td>0.2190 (0.7810)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.5 Tax harmonization</td>
<td>-0.1970 (0.2540)</td>
<td>-0.6530 (1.3880)</td>
<td>0.1560 (1.0200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.6 Monetary policy (for the euro states)</td>
<td>1.0790 (0.2020)</td>
<td>-0.2900 (0.7860)</td>
<td>0.0260 (0.9210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.7 Economic policy</td>
<td>1.0420 (0.1960)</td>
<td>-0.1600 (0.7660)</td>
<td>0.2920 (0.8670)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.8 Employment policy</td>
<td>1.5150 (0.2020)</td>
<td>-0.1690 (0.7060)</td>
<td>0.2050 (0.7950)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>$\lambda_1$ (s.e.)</th>
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<th>$\lambda_5$ (s.e.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.9 Social policy</td>
<td>0.6620 (0.1750)</td>
<td>-0.3660 (0.7750)</td>
<td>0.0560 (0.8690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.10 Social security rights</td>
<td>0.0190 (0.2400)</td>
<td>-0.4740 (1.3600)</td>
<td>0.5070 (1.7080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.11 Common foreign policy</td>
<td>-0.0550 (0.1780)</td>
<td>-0.4220 (0.9060)</td>
<td>0.1230 (1.0750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a.12 Defense policy</td>
<td>-1.6670 (0.8720)</td>
<td>-0.8430 (1.7680)</td>
<td>0.3920 (2.1640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.1 Agriculture</td>
<td>0.8480 (0.1610)</td>
<td>0.2620 (0.7540)</td>
<td>0.1710 (0.8370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.2 Structural and cohesion policies</td>
<td>1.5500 (0.1870)</td>
<td>0.1220 (0.7070)</td>
<td>0.2440 (0.5870)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.3 Area of freedom, security and justice</td>
<td>0.3300 (0.1440)</td>
<td>-0.0350 (0.3750)</td>
<td>0.0250 (0.3590)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.4 Internal market</td>
<td>2.1670 (0.4090)</td>
<td>0.2400 (1.7980)</td>
<td>0.6520 (1.4490)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.5 Tax harmonization</td>
<td>-0.1360 (0.3020)</td>
<td>-0.4000 (1.9640)</td>
<td>0.8470 (2.2900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.6 Monetary policy (for the Euro states)</td>
<td>0.3170 (0.2540)</td>
<td>0.2830 (1.8580)</td>
<td>0.0700 (1.5290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.7 Economic policy</td>
<td>0.4130 (0.4130)</td>
<td>0.3750 (3.7550)</td>
<td>0.0580 (2.0580)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.8 Employment policy</td>
<td>0.9780 (0.2790)</td>
<td>0.1200 (1.7470)</td>
<td>0.7190 (1.5530)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.9 Social policy</td>
<td>0.7180 (0.1850)</td>
<td>0.0950 (0.9200)</td>
<td>0.3940 (0.8640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.10 Social security rights</td>
<td>-0.2740 (0.2830)</td>
<td>0.2110 (1.6920)</td>
<td>0.6320 (1.3590)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.11 Common foreign policy</td>
<td>-2.7940 (0.5520)</td>
<td>0.1250 (1.9420)</td>
<td>0.8180 (1.6920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18b.12 Defense policy</td>
<td>-2.7370 (0.5440)</td>
<td>0.1300 (1.9360)</td>
<td>0.7990 (1.7010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19 Budgetary rights of the EP</td>
<td>0.3500 (0.1190)</td>
<td>-0.0510 (0.2340)</td>
<td>0.0850 (0.2680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20 Stability and Growth Pact I</td>
<td>-0.1870 (0.1150)</td>
<td>0.0570 (0.1780)</td>
<td>-0.0340 (0.2070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q21 Stability and Growth Pact II</td>
<td>0.5220 (0.1260)</td>
<td>-0.1180 (0.2980)</td>
<td>0.0110 (0.3110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q22 Defense</td>
<td>1.2470 (0.5030)</td>
<td>-0.8030 (1.6640)</td>
<td>0.1290 (1.8640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25 External borders</td>
<td>1.8220 (0.1620)</td>
<td>-0.1580 (0.3510)</td>
<td>0.0200 (0.3810)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24 Migration and asylum</td>
<td>0.8630 (0.2080)</td>
<td>-0.5180 (1.1580)</td>
<td>-0.0830 (1.1650)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2
The measure of adapted coherence for the evaluation of experts

With respect to the comparability of the expert coherence across countries and actors we face the following problem. The number of experts differs between actors (and countries). A different number of experts naturally results in a different ex-ante probability of complete coherence, since if we only interviewed one expert we have an ex-ante probability of complete coherence equal to 1. Therefore the measure of adapted coherence (AC) is based on the following calculation. First we calculated the theoretical probability for all experts to agree with the most competent expert (TC) as a function of possible answers \(c\) to question i, the number of questions \(n\) and the number of experts \(e\):

\[
TC = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (1/c)^{n-i}}{n}
\]

In case we are interested in the coherence at the level of entire countries \(n\) is the number of questions times the number of actors. Second, we adjusted the empirical coherence \(EC\) which reveals the percentage of times the experts made identical statements divided by 100 \((EC\in[0;1])\) using the theoretical probability for coherence: \(AC = EC(TC/EC)\).

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\[
TC = \left(\frac{1}{q}\right)^{(q-1)} \frac{n}{e} 
\]

In case we are interested in the coherence at the level of entire countries \(n\) is the number of questions times the number of actors. Second, we adjusted the empirical coherence \((EC)\) which reveals the percentage of times the experts made identical statements divided by 100 \((EC \in [0;1])\) using the theoretical probability for coherence: \(AC = EC^{(TC/100)}\).

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